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NOTES
ing a valuable investment, or a commercial enterprise about to make
costly improvements. Lawyers, title insurance companies, and other
groups with commercial interests in land titles should not object to a
modernization that would have no substantial affect on their commercial
interests.
LEGISLATIVE REVISION OF PROPERTY CRIMES IN INDIANA
The Indiana legislature in 1963 enacted a comprehensive statute
entitled "The Offenses Against Property Act" which became effective
January 1, 1964.' The primary purpose of this act is to unify several
traditionally distinct property crimes in order to eliminate the procedural
technicalities which have hindered or precluded the conviction of offend-
ers in the past. Specifically, larceny, embezzlement, obtaining property
by false pretenses, receiving stolen property and blackmail are no longer
separate offenses; they have been consolidated into a single offense, theft,
which can be committed in various ways. In addition to consolidation,
substantive changes have been incorporated. Therefore, the act represents
a revision rather than merely a re-codification of prior Indiana law
relating to property crimes.2
Prior to the effective date of the act, the property crime sections
of the Indiana criminal code were a hodge-podge of multiplicitous pro-
visions and penalties. Seventy separate statutory sections dealing with
property crimes were in force, scattered throughout the criminal code.
Since many of these provisions were enacted years apart and without
reference to other sections, a great deal of duplication as well as much
unnecessary specificity resulted. More serious, however, was the fact that
similar criminal conduct was frequently accorded substantially different
punishment. For example, the criminal code not only contained general
1. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3028 to -3041 (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963). A very similar
statute was approved in Illinois July 1, 1961, which became effective January 1, 1962.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §15 (Spec. Pamphlet 1961).
2. The repealing clause of the new act expressly states that the following Indiana
laws relating to property crimes remain in force: IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4102 (Burns 1956)
(bank robbery) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4710 (Burns 1956) (automobile banditry) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 10-4101 (Burns 1956) (robbery) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4709 (Burns 1956)
(commission of or attempt to commit a crime while armed with a deadly weapon). Since
provisions of the new act deal with obtaining property by threat, IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-
3030(1) (c) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963), and attempts to obtain property by threat, IN.
ANN. STAT. § 10-3041 (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963), prosecutors will have the choice of
relying on the new provisions or the unrepealed provisions noted above in cases involving
robbery or attempted robbery.
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sections which defined and set the punishment for grand larceny and
petit larceny,' but other sections dealt with larceny of public records, wills
and codicils, horses, mares, mules and jennets, male and female dogs,
vehicles, and shoplifting, and the punishment under each was different.'
A consideration of the multitude of former embezzlement provisions
makes the deficiencies of the prior law even more evident. There were
separate provisions dealing with embezzlement by public officers, private
employees, attorneys, railroad employees, innkeepers and carriers, bailees,
tenants, treasurers, city officials, fiduciaries and bankers.' Again, the
penalties for substantially similar conduct frequently varied.6 Moreover,
3. Ind. Acts 1941, ch. 148, § 9 (grand larceny). If the property taken exceeded
one hundred dollars, the penalty was a maximum fine of five hundred dollars and
one to ten years imprisonment. Ind. Acts 1929, ch. 156, § 2 (petit larceny). The
maximum penalty was'a fine of five hundred dollars and five years imprisonment.
4. Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 384 (public records: maximum fine of one thousand
dollars and imprisonment of from six months to fourteen years); Ind. Acts 1905, ch.
169, § 383 (wills and codicils: maximum fine of one thousand dollars and two to four-
teen years imprisonment) ; Ind. Acts 1911, ch. 180, § 1 (horses etc.: imprisonment from
three to fiften years) ; Ind. Acts 1951, ch. 237, § 1 (dogs: penalty was "the punishment
prescribed for larceny provided the dog had not maimed any sheep." If the dog was
worth up to $99, the penalty for petit larceny applied); Ind. Acts 1927, ch. 201, § 4
(vehicles; imprisonment for one to ten years) ; and Ind. Acts 1959, ch. 194, § 1 (shop-
lifting: fine of two hundred dollars and one year in jail).
5. Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 390 (public officers: maximum fine of one thousand
dollars and imprisonment of from one to five years); Ind. Acts 1935, ch. 233, § 1
(private employees: if the property taken was valued at over one hundred dollars, the
maximum fine was one thousand dollars and imprisonment of from two to twenty years.
If the property was worth less than one hundred dollars, the maximum fine was five
hundred dollars and imprisonment for one year) ; Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169 § 393 (attor-
neys: maximum penalty was a one thousand dollar fine and imprisonment of from
two to fourteen years) ; Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 394 (railroad employees: maximum
fine of five hundred dollars and imprisonment of from one to five years); Ind. Acts
1905, ch. 169, § 395 (innkeepers and carriers: maximum fine of one thousand dollars
and imprisonment of from six months to fourteen years) ; Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 396
(bailees : fine of one hundred dollars and imprisoonment of from one to five years); Ind.
Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 398 (tenants: fine of five thousand dollars and imprisonment for
six months) ; Ind. Acts 1907, ch. 85, § 1 (treasurers: fine of one hundred dollars and
one to three years imprisonment) ; Ind. Acts 1919, ch. 146, § 1 (city officials: fine f
one thousand dollars and one to five years imprisonment) ; Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169,
§ 400 (fiduciaries: fine of one thousand dollars and one to five years imprisonment);
Ind. Acts 1933, ch. 103, § 1 (bankers: fine of one thousand dollars and one to five
years imprisonment).
6. For example, the penalty for embezzlement of public funds by a government
official was two to twenty-one years imprisonment and a maximum fine of double
the value of the property embezzled. Another section punished as embezzlement the
fraudulent failure by any such government official to turn over to his successor any
such funds, and the penalty under this section was one to five years imprisonment
and a maximum fine of one thousand dollars. See Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 390.
As to embezzlement by private employees, the penalty depended upon the amount em-
bezzled. Oddly enough, this was the only embezzlement provision where the amount
embezzled had any relation to the penalty. See Ind. Acts 1935, ch. 233, § 1. An inn-
keeper who embezzled property entrusted to him was subject to a maximum of fourteen
years imprisonment whereas a bailee who converted property was subjct to a maximum
penalty of only five years imprisonment, and neither section attached any significance
NOTES
in situations where larceny and embezzlement were distinguishable only
upon purely technical grounds, there could be significant variations in
penalty. A court's decision on such a nice question as whether an
accused had enough control over property to amount to possession rather
than mere access could determine whether he was subject to a maximum
imprisonment of twenty years for embezzlement or of only ten years for
grand larceny.7
To complete the picture, obtaining property by fraudulent means was
prohibited by numerous statutory provisions covering such specific con-
duct as the fraudulent obtaining of any written instrument or signature,
the fraudulent dealing with certain negotiable instruments, fraud on hotel-
keepers, fraudulent disposal of mortgaged swine, sheep or cattle, fraudu-
lent solicitation of charity, fraudulent conversion of personal property
held under a conditional sale contract, the use of spurious coins in vending
machines, and the fraudulent procurement of tourist camp accommoda-
tions.' These provisions also contained significant variations in penalties
based, in large part, upon insignificant artificial distinctions.' In addition,
the archaic distinction between obtaining property by false pretenses and
larceny by trick offered no rational basis for a differentiation in punish-
ment, and yet a difference persisted as long as the distinction was
recognized.Y
The fact that offenses such as larceny, embezzlement, obtaining
property by false pretenses and receiving stolen property have tradition-
to the amount of property embezzled. Compare Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 395, with
Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 396.
7. See, e.g., Warren v. State, 223 Ind. 552, 62 N.E.2d 624 (1945), where it was
held that the defendant employee who possessed the key to a storage room in which
the stolen property was located could not be convicted of embezzlement since he lacked
the possession necessary to constitute embezzlement.
8. These statutes, in the order presented in the text, were Ind. Acts 1907, ch.
228, § 1; Ind. Acts 1961, ch. 303, H8 1, 2; Ind. Acts 1933, ch. 67, § 1; Ind. Acts 1931,
ch. 19, § 1; Ind. Acts 1915, ch. 152, § 1; Ind. Acts 1927, ch. 182, § 1; Ind. Acts 1935,
ch. 115, 8 1; and Ind. Acts 1949, ch. 157, § 1718.
9. For example, the penalty under the general provision dealing with obtaining
property by false pretenses was one to seven years imprisonment and a maximum
fine of one thousand dollars, the court or jury having the discretion to reduce the
prison term to as low as ten days, Ind. Acts 1907, ch. 228, § 1. The punishment for
use of a fraudulent check, which due to Indiana case law was not punishable under the
general false pretenses section, was one to ten years imprisonment if the property
obtained was worth more than one hundred dollars and a maximum of one year if the
property was worth less than one hundred dollars. Thus, wholly different factors
determined the penalty in each instance-the discretion of the judge or jury on the one
hand and a mechanical test based upon the amount of money obtained on the other.
See Ind. Acts 1916, ch. 303 §§ 1, 2. The conduct involved in each offense was differenti-
ated upon the technical basis that a promise could not be a false pretense. Pierce v.
State, 226 Ind. 312, 79 N.E.2d 903 (1947).
10. See Johnson v. State, 222 Ind. 473, 54 N.E.2d 273 (1944), where the distinction
was reaffirmed. The new act abrogates the common law separation.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ally been considered distinct, combined with the principles that all
defendants are entitled to adequate notice of the offense charged and
cannot be charged with one crime and convicted of a different crime,
often resulted in procedural problems of great magnitude under the
former Indiana criminal code. Technical and antiquated distinctions
between the various offenses enabled imaginative lawyers to obstruct
the just administration of the criminal law by utilizing those distinctions
on behalf of their clients under the guise of acceptable and desirable
principles, such as the requirement of adequate notice of the offense
charged.
The extent to which such tactics can effectively be employed depends
upon the substantive and procedural rules in force in the particular juris-
diction. In Indiana, a statute provides that an indictment or affidavit for
larceny may contain a count for obtaining property by false pretenses, a
count for embezzlement and a count for criminal receiving, and "the ac-
cused may be convicted of either offense, and the court or jury trying the
cause may find all or any of the persons accused guilty of any of the
offenses charged."' 1 The prosecution did not have to elect which count
of the indictment it would rely on. 2 Further, Indiana courts have held
that a general verdict of guilty is permissible in a criminal case where
only one offense is charged in separate counts.'" If such a verdict could
have been rendered in a situation where, for example, larceny and em-
bezzlement were both charged, and if such a verdict would have been
affirmed on appeal where the evidence supportd a conviction for either
offense, the technical distinctions between the two offenses would have
been of little effect. However, the case law did not authorize a general
verdict in such a situation. Since each count alleged a separate offense, 4
the statute required that the jury convict the accused of one or the other.
If the jury selected the wrong offense because it failed to understand or
appreciate a technical distinction, the defendant could obtain a reversal
of his conviction on appeal. Thus, the statute placed the burden of mak-
ing the critical choice as to what offense the defendant had committed
on the jury instead of on the prosecutor. Of course, the prosecution could
have charged the defendant with a single offense since the joinder statute
11. IND. Ai. STAT., § 9-1114 (Bums 1956).
12. Bowen v. State, 189 Ind. 644, 128 N.E. 926 (1920).
13. Nordyke v. State, 213 Ind. 243, 11 N.E.2d 165 (1937); Dunlap v. State, 205
Ind. 384, 18 N.E. 475 (1932) ; Menick v. State, 63 Ind. 327 (1878).
14. Bowen v. State, 189 Ind. 644, 128 N.E. 926 (1920). That this conclusion is
correct is also evidenced by the fact that no case has been found in which a general
verdict was rendered where the accused was charged with two or more counts involving
larceny, embezzlement or false pretenses.
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was not mandatory." But, whether the choice was made by the prosecutor
or the jury, the possibility that a conviction would be reversed on appeal
for purely technical grounds was always present."0
In addition to the mechanical problems of prior law, the vast statu-
tory conglomeration failed to define and provide punishment for certain
anti-social conduct which should be prohibited by a modem penal
scheme."
I. THE OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY ACT
A. Section io-3o3o: Substantive Consolidation of Property Offenses
1. Section 10-3030(1) (a).
Indiana law formerly recognized the traditional distinction between
larceny and embezzlement. If one had mere access to or bare custody
of another's personal property, a conversion of that property with animus
furandi was larceny. On the other hand, if one had legal possession of
another's personal property and occupied a position of special trust in
relation to that property, his wrongful conversion of that property was
embezzlement.' 8 Yet, the case of Shackleford v. State' suggests that
a conviction for larceny could not have been set aside on the ground that
embezzlement had actually been committed. Shackleford claimed that his
conviction for larceny of a quantity of lead which he had allegedly taken
from his employer was erroneous since his conduct was covered by the
statutory provision concerning embezzlement by employees." The court,
15. "An indictment or affidavit for larceny nay contain a count . . . etc."
IND. AN,. STAT. § 9-1114 (Burns 1956). Numerous cases indicate that the common
practice has not been to combine these counts. In many situations the prosecutor
probably felt that the conduct in question clearly fell within a particular larceny or
embezzlement provision. Since a prosecutor should be better qualified to make this
critical choice than the jury, the failure to have used this permissible joinder statute
appears to have been both justified and desirable.
16. See, e.g., Gentry v. State, 223 Ind. 459, 61 N.E.2d 641 (1945), where the
affidavit charged the receipt of stolen goods and the evidence showed the receipt of
embezzled goods. On appeal, this was held to constitute a fatal variance. See also
Roberts v. State, 181 Ind. 520, 106 N.E. 970 (1914), where a conviction for larceny by
trick was reversed because the victim intended to part with title rather than just posses-
sion of a check which the defendant had procured by fraud. In Wright v. State, 168 Ind.
643, 81 N.E. 660 (1907) a conviction was reversed because the affidavit in a prosecution
for embezzlement alleged that the defendant had possession of the property embezzled
"as such employee" instead of "by virtue of such employment."
17. For example, prior law failed to punish criminal conduct relating to the
theft of realty, labor or the use of property.
18. See, e.g., Liesse v. State, 233 Ind. 250, 118 N.E.2d 731 (1953); Warren v.
State, 223 Ind. 552, 62 N.E.2d 24 (1945) ; Vinnedge v. State, 167 Ind. 415, 79 N.E. 353
(1906) ; Currier v. State, 157 Ind. 114, 60 N.E. 1023 (1901) ; Colip v. State, 153 Ind.
584, 55 N.E. 739 (1899).
19. 232 Ind. 694, 115 N.E.2d 120 (1953).
20. Ind. Acts 1935, ch. 233, § 1.
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affirming the conviction, tersely stated that the defendant "could have
been charged under either statute," and since the larceny provision
carried a lighter penalty the defendant "was not harmed, but, in fact,
benefited by such action." 1 This decision was apparently rendered in
total disregard of existing law; the court surely failed to recognize the
essentially distinct natures of larceny and embezzlement. The decision
allowed a defendant to be charged and convicted of one crime even
though a totally different crime was proved, and thus vitiated a de-
fendant's right to adequate notice of the offense charged. The court's
opinion made uncertain both the pleading requirements and substantive
elements of the offenses of larceny and embezzlement.
The Offenses Against Property Act should clarify this area of the
law. Section 10-3030(1) (a) of the new act, which states that a person
commits theft if he "knowingly2 . . . obtains or exerts unauthorized
control over property of the owner ... ,"23 eliminates the problem of
distinguishing larceny and embezzlement for it consolidates the two
offenses into one form of the new crime of "theft." The proscription
as to obtaining unauthorized control encompasses what formerly was
larcenous conduct, while the prohibition as to exerting unauthorized con-
trol includes former embezzlement situations. This conclusion is reinforced
by the statute's definition of "obtains" as the bringing about of a "trans-
fer of interest or possession, whether to the actor or another.
21. Shackleford v. State, 232 Ind. 694, 695, 115 N.E.2d 120 (1953).
22. 'Knowingly' means that a person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowl-
edge, of: (a) the nature or attendant circumstances of his conduct, described
by the section defining the offense, when he is consciously aware that his conduct
is of such a nature or that such circumstances exist. Knowledge of a material
fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that such fact exists.
(b) the result of his conduct, described by the section defining the offense,
when he is consciously aware that such result is practically certain to be caused
by his conduct. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3040(8) (a), (b) (Burns Spec. Supp.
1963).
23. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3030(1) (a) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
24. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040(9) (Bums Spec. Supp. 1963).
A unique problem that affects the entire statute should be mentioned at the outset.
The concept of control which forms the essential element of the criminal conduct under
the various provisions of the act is not specifically defined, although the phrase "obtains
or exerts control over property" is defined as including but not being limited to the
"taking, carrying, driving, or leading away, concealment, or the sale, conveyance, encum-
brance, transfer of title to or interest in or possession of property, or the securing or
extending a right to retain that to which another is entitled." IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-
3040(10) (Bums Spec. Supp. 1963). This definition, however, does not appear to serve
any function since the phrase it defines does not appear verbatim in any substantive
provision of the act. The intent of the drafters apparently was to give some context
to the general concept of control wherever that concept was a relevant consideration.
However, since the defined phrase does not appear verbatim in the act, it could be
argued that because under ordinary rules of strict construction of penal statutes the
phrase cannot be used to give meaning to other terms in the act such as "control," and
because the concept of control has no established common law meaning, the entire act is
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The old problems of distinguishing the two crimes which resulted from
technical distinctions between "possession," "access" and "custody" no
longer exist.
2. Section 10-3030(1) (b).
This section prohibits obtaining "by deception control over property
of the owner or a signature to any written instrument . .,"2" and
thereby transforms the previously separate offense of obtaining property
by false pretense into one form of "theft." It also eliminates one of the
most troublesome and unjustifiable distinctions, from a criminological
standpoint, which existed under the common law and prior Indiana law:
the distinction between the crimes of obtaining property by false pre-
tenses and larceny by trick. Indiana cases recognized that when a person
who was defrauded had intended to pass both title and possession of the
property involved to the defrauder, the offense was obtaining property
by false pretenses, but that when he intended to pass only possession,
the offense was larceny by trick.2" For example, where an accused falsely
represented that he was an officer of the law with authority to arrest
and extorted money from a third person by virtue of this representation,
the accused was guilty of obtaining property by false pretenses because
the victim intended to pass title to the money.17 However, if the accused's
conduct consisted of falsely representing that he was an agent of a
third party and the victim intended title to pass to the third party and not
to the accused, the offense was larceny by trick."8 The distinction was
based on the notion that when a victim intended to pass title the offense
could not be larceny by trick, for larceny was the obtaining only of
possession by fraud. The fallacy of the former law is that when one
obtains title to goods by deception he also obtains either actual possession
or the right to possession. Thus, there was no logical basis for precluding
a conviction of larceny by trick in any instance. From a criminological
standpoint, it is difficult to see what difference the victim's intent as to
the passage or retention of title should have made.
The new act, in section 10-3030(1) (b), abrogates the artificial
distinction between larceny by trick and obtaining property by false pre-
void for vagueness. It is submitted that this extreme result will not occur for a
sufficiently definite meaning could be given to the concept of control by a judicial
decision declaring that "control" is to be defined the same as "obtains or exerts control
over property." See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 27-55 (2d ed. 1960).
25. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3030(1) (b) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
26. Johnson v. State, 222 Ind. 473, 54 N.E.2d 273 (1944) (false pretenses);
Roberts v. State, 181 Ind. 520, 104 N.E. 970 (1914) (reversed conviction for larceny
by trick; larceny by trick and false pretense distinguished and discussed).
27. Perkins v. State, 65 Ind. 317 (1879).
28. Grunson v. State, 89 Ind. 533 (1883).
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tenses by classifying all forms of fraudulent theft as theft by deception.
That section's prohibition against obtaining control over property by
deception, because of the statute's definition of "obtains," encompasses
both a "transfer of title to or interest in or possession of property."2
In addition to consolidating offenses, section 10-3030 (1) (b) intro-
duces significant substantive changes into Indiana law. Under former
Indiana law and the common law, a charge of obtaining property by
false pretenses could not be predicated upon a fraudulent promise by the
defendant to perform an act in the future."0 The charge could only be
based upon a misrepresentation as to the existence or non-existence
of a fact. The reason for this limitation was a fear that if fraudulent
promises were recognized as a false pretense, mere breach of contract
could be made the basis for imposing criminal liability."' The unfortunate
consequence of the exclusion was that it operated to remove from the
offense of larceny by trick conduct very similar to that which was
included within it.
Now, section 10-3040 states that "deception" includes knowingly
promising performance which the actor does not intend to perform or
knows will not be performed. 2 It also provides that a failure of promised
performance, standing alone, is not evidence that the actor, at the time
of the promise, did not intend that performance would be rendered.88
This proviso protects defendants from unwarranted criminal liability
for ordinary breaches of contract,3" but it does impose criminal liability
where property is obtained through a fraudulent promise and the neces-
sary intent is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Similar innovations under the new law result from the expansion
of the kind of statements which can be "deceptive" to include state-
29. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040(10) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
30. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 166 Ind. 85, 76 N.E. 881 (1905).
31. In Brown v. State, supra note 30, the court stated that to permit any criminal
prosecution for obtaining money by virtue of a fraudulent promise would mean that
"breach of contract and crime will scarcely be divided by any appreciable line, and acts
which have been understood as creating mere civil liabilities, will be punished criminally.
A pretense, therefore, that a party would do an act he did not intend to do is not within
the statute." Ibid.
32. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040(3) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
33. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040(3) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
34. In the case of a drawer of a check upon which payment is refused by the
drawee, the fact that the drawer has insufficient funds or no account with the drawee
does create an inference that the drawer intended to deprive the owner permanently
of the benefit of the property received. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040(3) (f) (Burns
Spec. Supp. 1963). This presumption is preserved from the former fraudulent check act,
Ind. Acts 1927, ch. 201, § 6, as amended by Ind. Acts 1959, ch. 92, § 1, and represents
one situation where a subsequent failure to perform does create an inference f
fraudulent intent as of the time the promise was made.
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ments of value, law or opinion." Under prior Indiana law, such state-
ments could only give rise to criminal liability as false representations
when they were such as would deceive a man of ordinary intelligence
or knowledge.3" But this objective standard was certainly inadequate.
A victim's negligence or sub-standard knowledge should not have been
a basis for exculpating a defendant who perpetrated a fraud upon such an
individual. Such persons are likely to be the most common targets for
swindlers, so the force of the criminal law should have been vigorously
applied rather than withheld in such cases. The new law recognizes this
inadequacy of prior law and seems to correct it. Section 10-3040(3), in
stating the various meanings of "deception" under the new law, places
primary emphasis upon the actual false impression created in the mind
of the victim by the defendant's conscious action or inaction."7 The
section suggests no requirement that the false impression must be such
as would exist in the mind of a reasonable man.
Finally, former Indiana law imposed no criminal liability for
obtaining property following a false representation unless the victim's
reliance upon that representation was the basis of the transfer. 8 Since
theft under the new statute is only committed if one gains control over
property of another by deception, former law as to the necessity for re-
liance is apparently retained. This requirement is sound since it guaran-
tees a causal relation between social harm and the conduct of the accused.
3. Section 10-3030(1) (c).
Section 10-3030(1) (c) makes obtaining "by threat control over
property of the owner or a signature to any written instrument . ."
35. "Deception may relate to the fact, value, law, opinion, or intention." IND.
AiN. STAT. § 10-3040(3) (Bums Spec. Supp. 1963).
36. See, e.g., State v. Burnett, 119 Ind. 392, 21 N.E. 912 (1889) ; Miller v. State,
73 Ind. 88 (1880).
37. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040(3) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963) states:
Deception means knowingly to: (a) create or confirm another's impression
which is false and which the actor does not believe to be true; or (b) fail to
correct a false impression which the actor previously has created or confirmed;
or (c) prevent another from acquiring information pertinent to the disposition
of the property involved; or (d) sell or otherwise encumber property and fail
to disclose a lien, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of
the property, whether such impediment is or is not valid, or is or is not a matter
of official record; or (e) fails to correct a false impression which he knows
to be influencing another to whom he stands in a relationship of special trust
and confidence; or (f) promise performance which the actor does not intend to
perform or knows will not be performed.
38. The false pretense must at least be one of the inducements without which the
defrauded party would not have parted with the property. Greening v. State, 198 Ind.
706, 153 N.E. 412 (1926). The false pretense must have been a "material inducement."
Gillespie v. State, 194 Ind. 154, 142 N.E.2d 194 (1924). The false pretense must have
been a "controlling cause." McCram v. State, 189 Ind. 677, 128 N.E. 848 (1920).
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punishable as one form of theft. It applies to that conduct which under
prior law constituted blackmail or extortion. 9 The definition of threat
under the act states that the offense can consist of a threat to (1) inflict
physical harm on the person threatened or any other person or property;
(2) subject any person to physical confinement or restraint; (3) commit
any crime [new]; (4) accuse anyone of any crime; (5) expose any per-
son to hatred, contempt or ridicule; (6) harm the credit or business
repute of any person; (7) take or withhold official action [new];
(8) bring about a strike, boycott, etc. where the property demanded is
not for the benefit of the group which the actor purports to represent
[new]; and, (9) be or not be a witness with respect to another's legal
claim or defense except where there is an honest and reasonable claim
for witness fees or expenses [new] .4" This definition not only extends
criminal liability to encompass several types of threats not covered under
prior law but it also extends Indiana law to include threats made against
persons other than the individual from whom the property is extorted."1
Prior case law which held that the commission of blackmail was not
precluded by the fact that the person threatened to be accused of a
criminal offense was actually guilty of such offense is apparently re-
affirmed since the new provisions make no reference to the guilt or
innocence of the person threatened.42
The full implications of section 10-3030(1)(c) can be appreciated
only when juxtaposed with the provision in the new act which states that
claim of right is a defense to any crime specified in the statute. Section
10-3034 states that "a person does not commit a crime under this Act
when he acts under an honest claim of right in that: (a) he is unaware
that the property is that of another; or (b) he believes that he is entitled
to the property. . . ." The effect of the claim of right provision upon
theft by threat is that the obtaining of property by any of the threats
enumerated above will not result in criminal liability if the actor
believes he had a right to the property obtained. It is submitted that such
39. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3030(1) (c) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963). Repealed is the
former blackmail statute, Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 37. Conduct prohibited by IND. ANN.
STAT. § 10-3701 to -3728 (Burns 1956), dealing with official negligence and misfeasance,
will be covered by the new act where the misfeasance involves the obtaining of property
by threat to take or withhold official action. See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3030(1) (C) &
10-3040(18) (g) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
40. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040(18) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
41. The former blackmail statute was phrased so that for the offense to be com-
mitted, the person threatened bad to be the person parting with the property. Ind. Acts
1905, ch. 169, § 370.
42. Kessler v. State, 50 Ind. 229, 233 (1875): "[A]lthough a person may have
been guilty of crime or immorality, there is no reason why his money or property should
be extorted from him by threatening to accuse him thereof."
43. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3034 (Bums Spec. Supp. 1963).
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a blanket exculpation is undesirable as to any one of the categories
listed above. There are situations under category (a) where a person,
in a flash of temper, might threaten to strike another whom he
honestly believes has unlawfully obtained property from him. It is un-
questionably proper for the criminal law to take account of and leave un-
sanctioned such frailties which are inherent in human nature. On the
other hand, the law of a civilized society should never tolerate a threat
to inflict death or serious injury with a deadly weapon, no matter what
the actor believes he is entitled to. Similarly, there are situations under
category (b) where the law should and does recognize the right of a
person who believes he has been wronged to threaten to subject the
believed wrongdoer to physical restraint. A good example of this is
the store manager who is permitted to temporarily detain for ques-
tioning a person he reasonably believes has stolen property from the
premises. However, if the manager should threaten to have the person
seized, locked up in the basement and searched unless he turns
over the item believed to be stolen, it is doubtful that claim of right
should be a defense. Similar problems could be shown to exist under the
other categories. The point is that any blanket rule in the criminal law
that fails to account for distinctions between significantly different types
of conduct is undesirable.
The final observation concerning section 10-3030(1) (c) is that if
the property obtained by threat does not belong to the person from whose
possession it is received, the fact that the victim did not own the property
will not exculpate the accused. This is so because the act defines "owner"
as any "person, other than the actor, who has possession of or any other
interest in the property involved, even though such interest or possession
is unlawful, and without whose consent the actor has no authority to
obtain or exert the complained of control over the property."4 Indeed,
even a thief will be the "owner" of property as to all but the true owner
or his agent. And, if the novel case should arise where a person obtains
property by threat not realizing that he actually owns the property, theft
will result under the new act.
4. Section 10-3030(1)(d).
Section 10-3030(1) (d) provides that theft is committed by one who
"obtains control over stolen property knowing the same to have been
stolen by another .... ,4 It eliminates the distinction between receiving
44. IND. AN. STAT. § 10-3040(2) (Bums Spec. Supp. 1963).
45. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3030(1) (d) (Bums Spec. Supp. 1963).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
stolen goods and other property crimes by making criminal receiving a
form of theft.
The new section has both good and bad aspects. It does not dis-
tinguish between professional receivers who are dealers in stolen property
for purposes of re-sale and non-professional receivers who consume or
abandon the property they acquire." This is another instance where the
new law fails to distinguish between types of conduct which have signifi-
cantly different social implications. To its favor, the statute codifies the
prior fragmented Indiana law on criminal receiving by repealing statutes
which had created as separate offenses receiving stolen goods, receiving
stolen goods from other states, receiving stolen horses, and receiving
stolen vehicles." However, the new law does not retain the proscription
of the repealed statutes against aiding or abetting the concealment of
stolen goods, and it unquestionably should have.
The new statute also eliminates the necessity which existed under
prior law of specifying in the indictment or affidavit whether the accused
had received goods obtained by larceny, embezzlement or false pretences.4"
Before, if the prosecution alleged the receipt of stolen goods and the
evidence showed that the goods had been embezzled, a conviction could
be reversed for a variance between the pleading and the proof.4" Under
the new act, "stolen property" is defined as property over which control
has been obtained or exerted by theft." Therefore, a charge which
merely alleges that the defendant knowingly received stolen property
will be sufficient and will vitiate any danger of a variance since
"theft" includes all of the prior, major property offenses. The definition
of stolen property in terms of theft will also result in the inclusion of
receiving property obtained by threat within the scope of theft by
criminal receiving. Under prior law there was no statutory basis for
charging the receipt of property obtained by threat as an offense, although
such conduct logically should have been subject to penal sanction.
5. Section 10-3030(1)(e).
This section of the new legislation states that theft is committed
when a person brings property which he obtained by theft into Indiana,
46. See HALL, THEM, LAW AND SoclEY 211-35 (2d ed. 1952).
47. These statutes respectively are Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 381; Ind. Acts 1905,
ch. 169, § 382; Ind. Acts 1911, ch. 180, § 1; and Ind. Acts 1927, ch. 201, § 4.
48. Gentry v. State, 223 Ind. 459, 61 N.E.2d 641 (1945). Proof that the thief
(transferor) was convicted of any of these offenses was not required for a conviction
for criminal receiving. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1613 (Burns 1956), which was not
repealed by the new act.
49. Gentry v. State, supra note 48.
50. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040(17) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
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wherever that theft occurred. Prior law was unsatisfactory for it only
punished the bringing into the state of goods obtained by larceny; it had
no application to property which had been secured by false pretenses,
embezzlement, or threat."' The new act cures this deficiency since it
covers property obtained by "theft," and thus encompasses what formerly
was larceny, embezzlement, false pretenses and threat. It will also reach
the situation where a receiver brings property which he has criminally
received elsewhere into this state, since receiving is now a form of theft.
However, one must question the wisdom of defining and punishing such
conduct in a theft statute. The only element of theft that occurs in Indiana
in such a case is asportation. The statute therefore, in effect, converts
asportation alone into "theft." Furthermore, it would seem that the
social harm sought to be prevented by this section of the statute is the
harm that arises upon a sale of the stolen property in Indiana, and other
provisions in the act adequately cover that case."
6. The Mental Element Under Section 10-3030.
Theft under section 10-3030 is only committed if the actor
knowingly performs one of the proscribed acts when he "(a) intends
to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property;
or (b) uses, conceals or abandons the property in such manner as know-
ingly to deprive the owner permanently of such use or benefit; or (c)
uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing such use, concealment,
or abandonment probably will deprive the owner permanently of such use
or benefit." 3 Thus, the essential evil which the statute enunciates is
permanently depriving the owner of the use or benefit of property. The
actor must either directly intend this result, or he must deal with the
property knowing that a permanent deprivation will probably or neces-
sarily result. Of course, as with any section of the new law, the actor
may invoke claim of right as a defense if it is applicable.'
The new statute makes significant alterations in the mens rea
that has traditionally been required for each of the derivative offenses
of "theft." The mens rea formerly required for larceny was that the
accused intend at the time of taking to permanently deprive the owner
of his property. It was not necessary that the offender intend to
51. Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 380.
52.
53. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3030(2) (Bums Spec. Supp. 1963).
54. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3034 (Bums Spec. Supp. 1963).
55. Robinson v. State, 113 Ind. 510, 16 N.E. 684 (1887) ; Keely v. State, 14 Ind.
36 (1860). Presumably, the new act is in accord with the requirement of a concurrence
of act and intent.
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appropriate the property to his own use.5" Thus, referring to the quoted
provisions above, the new law would seem to retain intact the substance
of the larceny mens rea, but it is not at all clear from the statute's
language that the intent need any longer exist at the precise moment of
original taking.
The requisite intent for what formerly was embezzlement was
simply that the accused intend to appropriate the property feloneously;57
an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the use or benefit of the
property was not required.5" Therefore, insofar as section 10-3030
covers the area of what was embezzlement,5" emphasis has been shifted
from an intent to feloniously appropriate to an intent to permanently
deprive. This change would appear unwise since the typical excuse
offered by embezzlers, that they intended to return the property em-
bezzled, would now seem to be a valid defense. Because the harm of this
form of theft is the unauthorized exertion of control over the property
of another and because any intent to return is infrequently carried out,
the law should not recognize such a defense.
The intent required for the crime of false pretenses under prior
law was described in the cases as merely a "felonious intent" or an
"intent to defraud.""0  Under section 10-3030 an intent to defraud
without an intent to permanently deprive apparently will not support
a conviction of theft by deception.
The primary mental requirement in connection with receiving stolen
goods under prior law was knowledge on the part of the receiver that
the goods were stolen. The statutory test was phrased in terms of
knowledge so as to exclude criminal liability based upon negligence."
The issue before the courts was always whether the defendant had known
the goods were stolen rather than whether a reasonable man would have
known that fact. 2 The new act carries forward prior law, for the de-
fendant must obtain control over property knowing the property to have
56. Best v. State, 155 Ind. 46, 57 N.E. 536 (1900). It has been held that an
"intent to steal" must exist at the time of the taking. Hart v. State, 57 Ind. 102 (1877).
57. Lawer v. State, 221 Ind. 101, 146 N.E.2d 592 (1943).
58. Fowler v. Wallace, 131 Ind. 347, 31 N.E. 53 (1892).
59. Section 10-3030(1) (a) will not cover all forms of former embezzlement. Sec-
tion 10-3031 dealing with theft by failure to make the required disposition of property
will cover the former crime of embezzlement in situations involving fiduciaries, govern-
ment employees, and employees of credit institutions. Section 10-3038 will cover similar
special duty situations where the crime does not amount to theft.
60. Felonious intent: Knoop v. State, 233 Ind. 435, 120 N.E.2d 268 (1954);
McCram v. State, 189 Ind. 677, 128 N.E. 948 (1920) ; Stifel v. State, 163 Ind. 628, 72
N.E. 600 (1904). Intent to defraud: Crouch v. State, 229 Ind. 326, 97 N.E.2d 860 (1951).
61. Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 381.
62. See, e.g., Parsons v. State, 191 Ind. 194, 131 N.E. 381 (1921); Benedict v.
State, 165 Ind. 523, 76 N.E. 111 (1905).
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been stolen. "Knowingly," under the new act, always includes awareness
either of the fact itself or of the substantial probability that the fact
exists. Therefore, mere negligence would not support a conviction under
this section. It has been argued that certain presumptions of knowledge
should be imposed in the case of professional dealers in stolen goods,
but the new act does not incorporate any such provisions.63 Since the
social harm posed by dealers who resell stolen goods is much greater than
the harm generated by those who receive stolen goods for purposes of
consumption, a sound basis exists for imposing presumptions of knowl-
edge in the case of dealers.
A rather serious and perhaps unforeseen consequence may result
from the terminology employed in defining the states of mind or
"intents" which can result in criminal liability for theft under section
10-3030. It was noted earlier that if the actor deals with property
knowing that his action will permanently deprive the owner of the use
or benefit of the property, or if the actor uses the property knowing such
permanent interference will probably result, theft is committed. Con-
sequently, if the actor intentionally or recklessly destroys property of the
owner, theft may result. This broad definition of theft could result in the
inclusion under the statute of various types of misconduct which have
neither traditionally nor in modern times been connected with theft.
Suppose a person, in a fit of anger, intentionally destroys property of
another. Such conduct would carry the penalty designated for theft,
while formerly such misconduct was punishable only under the malicious
trespass statute which is still in force.6" The maximum penalty under
this statute is a fine of twice the value of the property involved and
twelve months imprisonment." However, a person convicted of theft
can be imprisoned for as long as ten years.6" This significant disparity
in possible penalties for identical conduct is as unfortunate as the
numerous situations under prior law where overlapping statutes or
technical distinctions in defining particular crimes resulted in widely
differing penalties for essentially similar conduct. Moreover, it is ques-
tionable whether the malicious or reckless destruction of property should
be classified as theft at all. The essential notion of theft has always
been that the criminal conduct results both in a deprivation of the
owners enjoyment and a benefit to someone other than the owner."'
63. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.8(4) (Tent. Draft No. 2 1954).
64. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4509 (Burns 1956).
65. Ibid.
66. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3039 (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
67. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.8(4) (Tent. draft No. 2 1954), punishing
criminal mischief separately from theft. Se: also MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.1 (Tent.
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Section 10-3030(2), however, would seem to be satisfied simply by a
deprivation to the owner, and therefore includes cases where property is
destroyed. It is submitted that the traditional nature of theft is so
entrenched that to include within its concept situations where only de-
privation is involved introduces into that concept activities which differ
substantially in kind from the activities of thieves and swindlers. Such a
classification overlooks the socially significant differences which exist
between the types of conduct involved.
C. Section io-3o3i: Theft by Failure To Make Required Disposition
Of Property
Section 10-3031 sets forth the crime of theft by failure to make a re-
quired disposition of property. It replaces some of the former specific
sections dealing with embezzlement and contains special rules to be
applied in cases involving government employees, fiduciaries, and persons
engaged in certain businesses who are subject to a statutory obligation to
reserve funds for specified purposes.
Section 10-3031, generally, provides that a person who obtains
property upon agreement or subject to a known legal obligation to make
specified payment or other disposition, whether from the property or its
proceeds, commits theft if he deals with the property as his own and
fails to make the required payment or disposition. It was enacted for two
purposes. First, it covers situations where no one other than the actor
ever had possession of the funds or property and hence section 10-3030
would not apply.68 When a person fails in a duty to reserve a part of
certain funds in his own possession for specified purposes, he commits
theft by virtue of this provision. Thus, an employer who is under an
obligation to reserve a certain part of his employee's wages to satisfy
specified obligations to those employees will commit theft if he fails to
make such payments.6" The same fate will befall a retailer who defaults
in his duty to collect and pay over sales taxes. Secondly, the section was
enacted to replace the former statutory provisions covering embezzlement
by persons in positions of special trust and embezzlement by public em-
ployees."0 It enumerates certain categories of individuals and declares
that any person within these classes who fails to make a required payment
Draft No. 2 1954), which states that the actor must have the purpose of disposing of
the property for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto.
68. INDIANA LEGISLATIVE ADVISORY Comm., REPORT OF THE CRIMINAL CODE STUDY
Comm., App. I, at 271 (1962) (hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE CRIMINAL CODE
STUDY CoMM.)
69. Ibid.
70. These sections were formerly found in IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-1701 to -1718(Bums 1956).
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or fails to pay over to a successor any funds that should be so disposed
of will be inferred both to have had knowledge of any legal obligation
imposed with reference to the property in question and to have dealt with
the property as his own. The classes of persons subject to this provision
are employees of the government and employees of credit institutions,
fiduciaries, and persons subject to a statutory obligation to reserve
property for specified purposes.
1. Obligations to reserve funds for specified purposes.
Section 10-3031, as stated above, is designed in part to encompass
situations where the property in question has never been in the possession
of the victim. The essential prerequisite to theft under this section is a
present duty on the part of the actor to reserve property for some speci-
fied purpose; a general promise to be performed in the future is not
sufficient.7' For example, a mere debtor who fails to pay his obligee
could not be guilty of theft under 10-3031 since, in such a case, there
is only a general promise to pay in the future rather than a present duty
to reserve property for the payment of the debt.
But though it is clear that the section was meant to apply to situations
where an employer is to reserve funds due to his employees for specified
purposes and fails to do so,"2 it would seem doubtful that the statute's
drafters accomplished that result. The act is phrased in terms of one
who obtains property subject to an obligation to reserve all or part of it
for some specified purpose.7" "Obtains," by statutory definition, is
receipt by a transfer of interest or possession."4 In the case posed, the
employer has not received a transfer of possession or interest to specific
funds but has just withheld part of the employee's pay and failed to
use it for the proper purpose. Unless the withheld funds are segregated
it is doubtful that the employee could be said to have any interest in the
funds since, there being no res, a trust would not have come into exist-
ence under traditional trust theory."'
71. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3031 (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
72. REPORT OF THE CRIMINAL CODE STUDY Comm., App. I, at 271.
73. IND. ANN STAT. § 10-3031(1) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963) states: "A person
who obtains property . . . commits theft if he deals with the property obtained as his
own. 
74. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040(9) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963) provides in part:
"'Obtains' means . . . to bring about a transfer of interest or possession, whether to
the actor or another.. . ."
75. See BOGERT, TRUSTS § 27 (4th ed. 1963).
What the Indiana provision lacks can best be illustrated by noting a comparab'e
provision in the Model Penal Code: "a person who obtains property upon agreement or
subject to a known legal obligation, to make specified payments or other disposition,
whether from such property or its proceeds, or from his ozwn property . . . commits
theft." The italicized phrase does not appear in the Indiana provision and, as a result,
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2. Inferences For Certain Classes of Persons.
The second noteworthy aspect of section 10-3031 is that it creates
certain inferences as to the knowledge of persons in the following classes
who mishandle property: fiduciaries, employees of the government and
credit institutions, and persons subject to a statutory duty to reserve
property for specified purposes." Any person within these categories
is inferred to have acted with knowledge of any legal duty imposed with
respect to mishandled property and is inferred to have dealt with the
property as his own. Under the new act an inference is prima facie
evidence of the fact inferred, and, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, the question of the existence of that fact is to be presented
to the trier of fact." If evidence to the contrary is presented, the question
is still one for the trier of fact unless that evidence clearly negates the
existence of the fact inferred." Thus, the act creates a permissible
inference which eliminates a prosecutor's obligation to establish the fact
in the first instance.
Several of the statutory sections which were repealed and are now
covered by section 10-3031 apparently required neither guilty knowledge
nor intent for a violation." Generally, however, prior provisions did
require some form of guilty knowledge or intent."0 The new act takes a
the act fails to reach the person who has not "obtained" the property in question,
although it will reach persons such as retailers who receive and hence obtain funds
subject to the duty to reserve a specified amount for sales taxes and contractors who
receive installment payments subject to the duty to use such funds to pay materialmen
and laborers. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.4 (Tent. Draft No. 2 1954) (Emphasis added.)
Oddly enough, where the categories of persons subject to the special provisions of this
section are defined, it is stated that "a person engaged in a business subject to a
statutory obligation to reserve property received or equivalent amou.'s of his own
property for specified purposes" is included. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3031(2) (C) (Burns
Spec. Supp. 1963). The problem is that the language of the provision governing tl~e
proscribed conduct clearly does not cover him.
76. The following facts will support the inferences of knowledge and self-dealing:
(1) failure to make a required payment or disposition, (2) falsification of an account,
(3) shortage in an account, (4) failure by an employee or officer of the government
to turn over property remaining in his hands to his successor in office, (5) deposit by a
government employee of government property contrary to law, or (6) an illegal exchange
of government property for other property by an officer or employee of the government.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3030(1) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
77. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3031(2) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
78. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040(7) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
79. See, e.g., Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 164, § 3 (misuse of public funds) ; Ind. Acts 1905,
ch. 169, § 398 (treasurers and township trustees); Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 400
(fiduciaries).
80. See Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 39, dealing with public officers and requiring a
fraudulent failure to pay over; Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169 § 396, dealing with bailees
and requiring an intent to defraud; Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 399, dealing with school
trustees, city officials, and county auditors, and requiring guilty knowledge, and Ind.




middle position by the device of permissible inferences. It avoids strict
criminal liability on the one hand and the need for formal proof of
knowledge on the other.
D. Section 10-3032: Theft of Lost or Mislaid Property
The Offenses Against Property Act introduces into Indiana law a
statutory provision which governs theft by finders of lost or mislaid
property. Prior to its enactment the criminal liability of finders was
covered by case law and existed as a form of larceny. An analysis of
Indiana cases shows that, to commit larceny, a finder had to have a
felonious intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property at the
time the finder first secured its possession."' In addition, unless the
finder knew or had a reasonable means of discovering the identity of the
owner at the time of the finding, there could be no larceny regardless of
his intent.3 2
Section 10-3032 states that a person who obtains control over lost
or mislaid property commits theft when he knows or learns either the
identity of the owner or a reasonable means of identifying the owner
and fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property to the
owner and intends to permanently deprive the owner of the use or
benefit of the property. The act specifies that reasonable measures in-
dude notifying the owner or any peace officer. If either of these
measures are taken, the finder will not be subject to criminal prosecution.
It is noteworthy that this provision equalizes the emphasis on intent
as betveen the time when the finder first takes possession and what may
often be a later point in time-when the finder discovers the identity of the
owner or a reasonable means of identifying him. Thus, an intent to
permanently deprive the owner of his property need not exist at the
time the finder takes possession as previously required. Social interests
seem better protected by this change since the harm to be prevented is
not the original taking of possession by the finder but rather the finder's
failure to restore the property to the owner when the opportunity presents
itself. By making the intent of the finder at this potentially later point
a crucial inquiry, the law accentuates the concurrence of criminal intent
with failure to act.
This analysis assumes that the provision stating that reasonable
measures shall include notifying the owner or any police officer will be
interpreted as establishing two specific courses of action which a finder
may, but need not, take to avoid criminal liability for theft. It is possible,
81. Starck v. State, 63 Ind. 285 (1878).
82. Wolf ington v. State, 53 Ind. 343 (1876), Bailey v. State, 52 Ind. 462 (1876).
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however, that this language will be construed as a statutory prescription
of the reasonable measures which a finder must take to return the
property to the owner. Therefore, since notifying a police officer would
always be an available course of action, any finder who fails to notify
an officer or do anything else to identify the owner will commit theft if
he intends to keep the found item. A provision which could be construed
as favorable to finders by stating the minimum a finder may do to avoid
criminal liability might, therefore, also be interpreted as creating
minimum requirements that a finder must satisfy to avoid liability. It
is questionable whether all finders, without regard to the value of the
property found, should be subjected to criminal liability for failing to
notify a police officer. The blanket notification requirement is logical
in situations where the property found has substantial value, but it
places an unreasonable burden upon the person who finds property of
little value. It is submitted that the provision should not be construed
as providing a minimum standard of reasonable conduct. A finder should
be required -to take steps to return the goods which are reasonable in
light of all of the circumstances, and notification of a peace officer
should always be sufficient.
E. Section 10-3033: Theft of Labor or Services or Use of Property
A survey of prior Indiana statutory provisions relating to property
crimes discloses that the law primarily protected tangible personalty and
intangibles represented by a tangible instrument. For example, the gen-
eral larceny provision punished the stealing of the "personal goods" of
another.8" The general false pretenses statute dealt only with the fraudu-
lent obtaining of "any money, bond, note, draft or check."'" These
statutes could not be construed to cover items such as services or the use
of property. And, even the embezzlement statute which encompassed
"money, coin, bills, notes, credits, choses in action or other article or
thing of value . ., was held not to cover services and use of
property
8 6
One of the most significant substantive changes in Indiana law
resulting from the enactment of the Offenses Against Property Act is
the recognition of labor, services, and the use of property as interests that
the criminal law should protect. It is desirable that a person who obtains
83. Ind. Acts 1941, ch. 148, § 9.
84. Ind. Acts 1907, ch. 228, § 1.
85. Ind. Acts 1935, ch. 233, § 1.
86. See, e.g., Mendenhall v. State, 189 Ind. 175, 126 N.E. 434 (1919), where the
opinion stated that only the kinds of property specifically enumerated in the embezzle-
ment statute could be embezzled. Such strict interpretation is, of course, common in
the criminal law. See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 35 (2d ed. 1960).
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the labor or services of another by deception or threat with no intent to
pay for the same,"7 or who has control over the labor of another and
wrongfully diverts such labor for his own benefit, be criminally punished.88
However, the new law does not reach one who wrongfully diverts
the benefit of his own labor or services from his master or employer.
Perhaps the reason for this omission is that in such a case there is no
fraud, threat or an "obtaining of unauthorized control" by the laborer
in an attempt to obtain the benefit of such services. A private decision
is all that is required; hence, the basic elements of theft seem lacking.
Moreover, no real harm is suffered by the employer since he has a cause
of action for breach of contract against the person who wrongfully
diverts his own labor. Where the wrongdoer diverts the labor of an
innocent third party on the other hand, the employer is legally bound to
pay the innocent person though the benefit of his services has inured
to another.
Other provisions of section 10-3033 establish as theft the evasion
of admission fees,8" obtaining transportation, lodging, or other services
available for hire," and obtaining or exerting control over movable
property for hire, with the purpose of evading payment.8 '
Section 10-3033 represents a recognition of the fact that human
time, labor and services have economic value and are capable of being
wrongfully obtained or diverted by thieves and swindlers. It is beyond
question that such legitimate interests can and should be protected by a
modem penal code."
87. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3033(2) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963). This section covers
situations where the actor gains, by deception or threat, the labor or services of others
with the purpose of evading payment for such services. Under this provision the actor
i not required to have had prior control over the person providing the services. For
example, if a person obtains services from a lawyer, doctor or any other independent
contractor with no intent to pay for them, he will commit theft under this section.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3033(1) (Bums Spec. Supp. 1963) is phrased so as to apply to
any person having a "calling or business" of providing the type of services wrong-
fully obtained.
88. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3033(2) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
89. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3033(4) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
90. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3033(3) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
91. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3033(5) (Bums Spec. Supp. 1963). Prior law was re-
stricted to wrongful conversion of motor vehicles by one who had rented or leased the
vehicle. Ind. Acts 1927, ch. 204, § 1. The new law will cover all types of chattels held
for rent.
92. The new law's emphasis upon the protection of valuable interests which can
be wrongfully appropriated is further illustrated by the inclusion of realty within the
definition of property that can be the subject of theft. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040(15)
(Burns Spec. Supp. 1963). Thus, a trustee who wrongfully conveys title of trust realty
to a bona fide purchaser to the detriment of the trust beneficiaries, or a person who
obtains title to realty by fraud, will be guilty of theft. Such conduct is just as wrongful
in the case of realty as it is in the case of personalty.
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G. Section 10-3034: Defenses of Claim of Right and Intent to Pay
Section 10-3034(1) is Indiana's first statutory declaration that
when one acts under an honest claim of right no property crime is com-
mitted although the conduct would otherwise constitute theft. Specifically,
this section provides that if an actor is unaware that the property involved
is that of another, or if he believes that he is entitled to the property
or is authorized to dispose of it as he does, no crime will result under
any provision of the act." However, the provision will not change
Indiana law since such defenses were recognized in prior case law dealing
with various property offenses which are now assimilated into the
new act.94
Section 10-3034(2) is apparently supposed to set forth the circum-
stances under which an intent to pay for property is a defense as well
as when an inference of intent to commit theft is permissible. The
wisdom of dealing with two such antithetical concepts even in a single
well-drafted sentence would be questionable. But where the sentence is
so poorly drafted that it defies rational interpretation, an intolerably
confusing situation is bound to result. The provision reads:
The new act would appear, however, to make an adverse possessor who knows
that the property is not his own subject to criminal liability for theft. The adverse
possessor would be exerting unauthorized control over the property of another within the
meaning of section 10-3030 and he would obviously intend to permanently deprive the
owner of the use or benefit of the land in question. Whether a person can be an adverse
possessor when he knows the property is not his own is not clear in Indiana due to
some rather conflicting case law. Analytically, such a person should be treated as an
adverse possessor if the statute of limitations for ejectment actions is running against
the true owner, whether the possessor believes the property is or is not his own. See,
generally, 1 I.L.E. Adverse Possession § 22 (1957). If the adverse possessor be-
lieves that the property is his, the claim of right defense would preclude a conviction
for theft. Iln. ANN. STAT. § 10-3034 (Burns 1963). This would include the typical
adverse possession situation involving mistaken boundaries.
The disappearance of the frontier in this country has substantially underminded
the notion that an adverse possessor serves a socially useful function by putting land
to use. It is anomalous, however, that the property laws of the state continue to
sanction such conduct while the new theft law apparently seeks to punish it as criminal.
It is submitted that this inconsistency in the laws of the state should be examined in
the light of modem social conditions, and either the property laws or the new theft
legislation should be amended so as to make them compatible.
93. The questionable application of this defense to situations involving theft by
threat is discussed supra pp. 836-37.
94. See, e.g., Mattingly v. State, 230 Ind. 431, 104 N.E.2d 721 (1952) (where one
receives property not knowing that it belongs to a person other than the transferor, he
is not guilty of receiving stolen property); Bough v. State, 200 Ind. 585, 105 N.E.
434 (1921) (where the defendant entered and took property out of a church believing
he held legal title to the church, no larceny was committed) ; Ridge v. State, 221 Ind.
101, 46 N.E.2d 592 (1943) (where the defendant believed that his contract with his
employer entitled him to keep a certain percentage of all sales, such belief precluded
an embezzlement conviction.)
Intent to pay for property does not include [preclude?]
criminal liability for theft, except that a person who helps
himself to property offered for sale or hire does not commit
theft if he intends and is able to pay promptly, provided that
concealment of property displayed or offered for sale or hire
and the removal of said property from any place of business in,
at or from which said property, or services with respect to prop-
erty, is displayed, or sold or offered for sale to the ultimate
consumer, shall constitute an inference that the actor intended
to obtain the property by theft.9"
The word "preclude" evidently was intended to appear in the act where
the word "include" is now found." If the word preclude was inserted
the provision apparently would state that a consumer who takes ad-
vantage of self-service facilities in any type of retail establishment would
not be guilty of theft merely for removing an item from a shelf. How-
ever, it is doubtful that the provision is even necessary, since such control
would certainly not be "unauthorized" as required by section 10-3030(1).
The provision also states, in effect, that if such person conceals the
property obtained and leaves the premises with it, his conduct creates an
inference that he intended to obtain the property by theft."7 Such an
inference is sound for it is reasonable to infer that a person intends to
obtain property by theft if he conceals it and leaves the premises without
paying for it. However, no definition is provided in the statute for the
term "conceals," and the omission could allow an inference of guilt to be
applied to one who leaves the premises merely forgetting to pay for an
item that he has, for example, placed in his pocket. But though the
statutory language is not precise, the inference represents what should be
a workable compromise between the interest of an accused in not being
unjustly convicted of crime and society's interest in effectively dealing
with one of the most common and costly forms of theft.
Although replacing "include" with "preclude" does make the pro-
vision comprehensible, it has the disadvantage of creating an anomaly:
If the actor intends to pay for the use or benefit of property it seems
clear that he does not intend illegally to permanently deprive the owner
of the use or benefit of the property."3 In other words, how can the
95. IND. AxN. STAT. § 10-3034 (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
96. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the word "preclude" rather than
"include" appears in the copy of the statute as proposed in REPORT OF THE CRIMINAL.
CODE STUDY CoMMi. 258.
97. This inference was phrased in terms of a presumption under the prior shop-
lifting statute. Ind. Acts 1959, ch. 194, § 3.
98. It is possible that § 10-3030(2) (a), defining the requisite intent for theft as
the intent "to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit" of the property,
could be construed to mean that one could intend to pay for property while still intending
to deprive the owner of the =se of the particular item taken. However, it is submitted
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intent to pay for property fail to preclude liability for theft?
Clarification through legislative amendment or judicial construction
is necessary before the exact meaning of this provision can be known.
H. Section 1o-3o35: Effect of Actor's Interest in Property
This section states that it is no defense to a charge of theft that the
actor has an interest in the property taken so long as the owner also has
an interest in it to which the actor is not entitled. It authorizes a partner
or co-owner of property who steals joint assets to be convicted of theft,
and prior case law holding that a husband may be convicted of stealing
from his wife when his act would be punishable if done by a third person
is apparently reaffirmed.9 These provisions provide additional examples
of the new law's recognition that interests which are valuable and capable
of being interfered with should be protected regardless of abstract,
technical property concepts.
Section 10-3035 also provides that an owner who is in possession
of encumbered property does not commit theft as against mortgagees,
conditional vendors or others having a security interest even in the form
of title in the property, by removing or otherwise dealing with the
property contrary to the terms of the security agreement. The provision
represents a relaxation of prior law. Statutory provisions now repealed
made criminal the removal, sale or conversion of mortgaged personal
property without the consent of the mortgagee. 0 and personal property
purchased under a conditional sale contract without the consent of the
conditional vendor."' Section 10-3040(3) (d) must, however, be con-
sidered in this regard. It states that theft by deception may be committed
when the actor sells or otherwise encumbers property and fails to disclose
a lien or other impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the
impediment is valid or invalid, recorded or unrecorded."0 2 Thus, the new
act punishes a failure to disclose an impediment to the title of property
to a purchaser or subsequent lienor and disregards the actor's violation
of the prior lienor's security agreement. Since, depending upon the
particular facts, the ultimate harm may fall either upon the purchaser
or the prior interest holder as a result of the defendant's conduct, both
the failure to disclose a prior impediment and a violation of a security
agreement should logically be subject to penal sanction. However, the
that if one does intend to pay for the property, he should not be held to have the
requisite intent to commit theft
99. Beasley v. State, 138 Ind. 552, 38 N.E. 35 (1894).
100. Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169 § 406.
101. Ind. Acts 1927, ch. 182, § 1.
102. IND. AN. STAT. § 10-3040(3) (d) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
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new law, in excluding criminal liability for violation of a prior security
agreement, does eliminate the possibility of criminal liability for purely
technical violations of such agreements.
I. Sections 10-3036 to 10-3038: Related Offenses
The Offenses Against Property Act defines various crimes which
do not amount to theft, presumably because the elements of intent or
control are lacking.
Section 10-3036 states that a person commits a crime when he
obtains or exerts unauthorized control over a vehicle 3 of another under
circumstances not amounting to theft. 4 This section will apply when the
actor takes a vehicle without the consent of the owner with an intent
to use the vehicle temporarily, rather than with an intent to permanent-
ly deprive the owner of its use as is required for theft under section
10-3030. Anyone who accompanies another and is aware that the other
person knowingly obtained or is exerting unauthorized control over a
vehicle is also guilty of an offense.0 5
There may be difficult problems under the new act in determining
when a person has obtained control of a vehicle. Prior law required
some movement (asportation)."' It is not clear whether, under the
new statute, a person will be held to have obtained control when he
enters the car, starts the engine, or when he moves the car. The best
indication of what the drafters intended is contained in the statutory
definition of "obtains or exerts control," which includes "taking, carry-
ing, driving or leading away . . . that to which another is entitled."'07
Arguably, the specific inclusion of "driving" requires movement, since
one does not drive a vehicle without moving it. If this interpretation
is adopted, prior law will remain unchanged in this respect.
The provisions of section 10-3037 deal with various types of de-
ceptive practices. Section (1) provides that any officer or manager of a
bank or credit institution who knowingly receives a deposit or other
investment and who knows the institution is insolvent at the time, com-
mits a crime. This conduct was a crime under former law, but it ex-
tended to employees as well as to bank officials.' The prior statute
103. "'Vehicle' means any device for transportation by land, water or air, including
mobile equipment with provision for transport of an operator, and draft or riding
animals." iND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040(19) (Bums Spec. Supp. 1963).
104. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3036 (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
105. This same language appeared in the former statutory provision dealing with
vehicle taking which is no longer in force. Ind. Acts 1941, ch. 748, § 8.
106. Warnke v. State, 89 Ind. App. 683, 167 N.E. 138 (1929) ; 52 C.J.S. Larceny
§ 6 (1947).
107. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040(10) (Burns Spec. Supp. 1963).
108. Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 401.
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was, however, limited to banks, whereas the new provision extends to
any "credit institution" including insurance companies, credit unions,
building and loan associations and investment trust companies."' Thus,
coverage of particular institutions has been increased while coverage of
personnel has been reduced.
The broader institutional coverage under the new act is an improve-
ment over prior law since there is no sound basis for distinguishing such
conduct on the part of officers and managers of banks from that of their
non-bank credit institution counterparts. The exclusion of employees
is also desirable since they play no role in determining institutional policy
with respect to investments and deposits and must follow the orders of
their superiors.
Section 10-3037(2) provides that a person who issues a check or
other order upon a credit institution or other person for payment of
money or property, knowing that it will not be paid by the drawee, com-
mits a crime. As under prior law,"' the fact that the drawer has insuf-
ficient funds in or no account with the drawee creates an inference that
the actor knew the instrument would not be paid. The inference is
rebutted, however, if the drawer pays the amount due on the instrument
to the drawee within thirty days after receiving notice of dishonor. Since
lack of funds also creates an inference under section 10-3040(3) (f)
that the drawer intended to permanently deprive the owner of the prop-
erty transferred, a prosecutor will be able to choose whether to utilize
the fact of insufficient funds for the purpose of proceeding with a prosecu-
tion for the lesser offense under section 10-3037 or for charging theft by
deception under section 10-3030. However, the fact that the drawer
paid the necessary amount to the drawee within thirty days after notice
of dishonor apparently does not rebut the inference of an intent to
permanently deprive under section 10-3040 as it does the inference in the
lesser offense under section 10-3037(2). Thus, payment by the drawer
within the time specified may have the anomalous result of increasing
the chances of a prosecution for the major theft offense, since the
prosecutor will still have the benefit of the inference of an intent to
permanently deprive. Such a result would be unfortunate for obvious
reasons.
Section 10-3037(3) provides that any person who knowingly dis-
seminates a false or deceptive advertisement through any medium to
promote a purchase or sale or to promote property or services of any
kind is guilty of an offense. Nondisclosure of relevant facts can render
109. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3040(21) (Bums Spec. Supp. 1963).110. Ind. Acts 1927, ch. 201, § 6 as amended by Ind. Acts 1959, ch. 92, § 1.
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an advertisement misleading under this provision, and it is in accord with
prior law. 1'
Section 10-3037(4) states that the making of any false or mislead-
ing statement for the purpose of obtaining credit, property, or services
is an offense. This, too, was covered in the same manner under prior
law.11 2
Section 10-3038 provides that a person commits a crime when he
knowingly misapplies entrusted property or property of the government
or of a credit institution under circumstances which do not amount to
theft. The offender need not have the intent required for theft. Property
is "misapplied" and hence a criminal violation occurs when the actor
deals with it in a manner contrary to government regulation as indicated
by statutes, ordinances or administrative rulings. Knowledge of the
relevant government statute, ordinance or regulation is inferred where
the actor is (1) a person responsible for safekeeping or discretionary
disposition of property of the government or of a credit institution or (2)
one who regularly engages in business as a fiduciary. This provision
replaces a large number of former statutes which punished various types
of misconduct in handling entrusted property. Some of these former
statutes required criminal intent or guilty knowledge while others re-
quired neither.1 3 The new provision represents a compromise by in-
ferring the knowledge required for the offense in situations where
societal interests require the utmost measure of good faith and honest
dealing.
K. Section 1o-3o39: Penalties
Any system of penal sanctions must be underpinned by a rational
basis. Prior Indiana property offense law did not meet this standard
for, as noted earlier, numerous statutes enacted at various times, cluttered
111. See Ind. Acts 1957, ch. 270, §§ 1-5.
112. Ind. Acts 1931, ch. 166, § 1-3.
113. See, e.g., Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 389 (misapplication of public funds,
requiring neither intent nor knowledge) ; Ind. Acts, 1905, ch. 169, § 390 (failure to
account by city and county officials, requiring the failure to be "fraudulent"); Ind.
Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 391 (failure of public officers to account to a successor, requiring
neither knowledge nor intent) ; Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 395 (innkeepers and carriers
who convert entrusted property, requiring the conversion to be "fraudulent"); Ind.
Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 396 (bailees such as factors, warehousemen, etc., who misapply
entrusted property or documents, requiring an "intent to defraud"); Ind. Acts 1905,
ch. 169, § 399 (school and township trustees and county auditors who misappropriate
any funds contrary to law, requiring such misappropriation to occur "knowingly");
Ind. Acts. 1905, ch. 169, § 400 (fiduciaries who fail to pay over or to account to proper
persons any property possessed by virtue of such fiduciary position, requiring neither
intent nor knowledge although the failure to pay over must be "without good cause") ;
Ind. Acts 1933, ch. 103, § 1 (making of false entries by bankers, requiring such entries
to be made "knowingly").
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with subtle distinctions and overlapping provisions, filled the statute
books. The Offenses Against Property Act represents a significant
improvement of prior law for it establishes consistent and rational pen-
alties for the various property offenses.
An intelligent system of penalties must take account both of the
conduct involved and the extent of social harm caused or threatened,"'
and the new act seems to do so. Section 10-3039 states basically that
any person who is convicted of theft of property not from the person
which is less than one hundred dollars in value shall, except as provided,
be subject to a maximum fine of five hundred dollars and imprisonment
of either one year or one to five years.1" If the property taken is worth
more than one hundred dollars, the offender may be fined a maximum
of five thousand dollars and/or imprisoned for a maximum of ten years.
The value \of the property taken thus serves as one basis for the
imposition of differing punishments under the act, and this differentia-
tion at the same time takes account of the extent of social harm caused.
However, the value of property approach tends to de-emphasize conduct,
especially in situations where the defendant reasonably believes the
property taken is worth less than it actually is." 6
The value of the property taken, as the statute recognizes, is not
the only criterion for measuring social harm. The act subjects a person
who steals certain types of property to the more severe maximum penalties
of ten years imprisonment and a five thousand dollar fine, regardless of
the value involved. Theft of motor vehicles, firearms, property of a
credit institution, government property, and testamentary instruments
can result in the imposition of the more severe penalty. Moreover, the
act emphasizes the type of conduct involved as a basis for applying
greater penalties, for theft from the person or by means of a threat of
physical harm to any person is punishable by ten years imprisonment
and/or a five thousand dollar fine, regardless of the value of the stolen
property.
114. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 310 (2d ed. 1960); Remington,
Criminal Law Revision-Codification vs. Piecemeal Amendment, 33 NEB. L. Rev. 396,
400 (1954).
115. The penalties for all forms of theft also include disenfranchisement and
removal of the privilege of holding any public office of profit or trust for any deter-
minate period.
116. See, e.g., MoDEL PENAL CODE § 206.15 (Tent Draft No. 2 1954), where the
following provision appears: "[T]he amount involved [which serves the function of
grading the offense] shall be deemed to be the highest value which the defendant could
reasonably have anticipated." Thus, the mental element or conduct in its broad sense
is given its role even where the amount taken is used as a basis for grading the offense.
However, a disadvantage of such a provision is the fact that it would place an additional
and problematical element of proof upon the prosecution in any case where the maximum
penalty was sought
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Where the offense involved is a related offense under the statute
not amounting to theft, the maximum penalty is a fine of five hundred
dollars and imprisonment for one year.11 7 Since one who violates a
related offense either lacks the necessary intent for theft or has failed
to obtain control over the property involved, the imposition of lesser
penalties is justified by reference to both the conduct and social harm
criteria. Where the actor has no intent to permanently deprive, his con-
duct differs significantly from that of a person who does entertain such
an intent. Likewise, the social harm caused is significantly less in a case
where control over the property was never obtained by the offender.
Finally, a defendant who is convicted of a second or subsequent
offense of theft of property displayed for sale or hire in a business
establishment is subject to a maximum fine of ten thousand dollars
and/or imprisonment for ten years. A greater penalty in such a case
cannot be justified on the basis of the conduct since, while two offenders
may commit identical crimes, one is subject to a greater penalty solely
on the basis of a past conviction. The greater penalty for a second or
subsequent offender can be grounded only on some idea that there is an
increased threat of social harm by repetitive criminal conduct. It is be-
yond the scope of this Note to examine and debate the pros and cons of
habitual criminal legislation. However, it should be noted that several
distinguished writers have bitterly criticized such legislation as unfair,
ineffective and based upon erroneous premises as to the criminological
aspects of recidivism." 8
II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
A. Procedural Effect of Substantive Consolidation
A major objective of those who drafted and helped enact the Offenses
Against Property Act was to eliminate many of the arbitrary, technical
distinctions which permeated prior theft law in order to end the dilatory
117. It should be noted that since one could be imprisoned for one year for com-
mitting only a related offense not amounting to theft, it is arguable that related
offenses under the act are felonies due to the statutory definition of felonies as
"offenses which may be punished with death or imprisonment in the state prison."
IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-101 (Bums 1956). This classification could have significant
effects when considered in conjunction with other statutes such as the Indiana Habitual
Criminal statute which subjects persons twice convicted of felonies to a possible
sentence of life imprisonment upon a third conviction. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2207
(Burns 1956). It is doubtful that the drafters intended to make all offenses under
the act felonies, especially in view of the serious consequences of such a classification.
Legislative redefinition of felonies so as to exclude all offenses where the maximum
imprisonment is a year or less would seem the best solution to this problem.
118. See, e.g., Brown, The Treatment of the Recidivist in the U. S., 23 CAN. B.
R-v. 640, 664 (1940) ; Hall, The Substantive Law of Crimes: 1887-1936, 50 HAav. L. RlTv.
618, 650 (1937) ; RuiBN, THFE LAw oF ChIMINAI. CoRREcrioN 400-01 (1913).
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and exculpatory procedural maneuverings on the part of defense attor-
neys. Whether that goal will be realized depends in large measure upon
how Indiana's judiciary will construe the effect of substantive consolida-
tion upon criminal procedure.
One question is whether the prosecution will be able to allege the
violation of a section of the new act in statutory language even though
the section by conjunction encompasses what formerly were separate
criminal offenses. Can an indictment or affidavit, for example, charge a
defendant with theft by knowingly obtaining or exerting unauthorized
control over the property of another, so that it will make little difference
whether the evidence shows the defendant had custody or possession at
the time he obtained the property allegedly stolen? It can be speculated
that such a practice will be allowed, for only in that event can the act's
primary purpose of eliminating archaic distinctions between essentially
similar conduct be acheived and unnecessary procedural technicality
eliminated.11
A somewhat different problem will arise where a provision other
than the one charged governs the conduct of the defendant. For example,
the prosecution may charge theft under section 10-3031 for failure to
make a required disposition of property and it could become clear at
trial that the general theft by deception provision of section 10-3030 is
applicable. Or, situations may occur where theft by threat is charged
and theft by deception is established. The question in such a situation
will be whether the prosecution can prove a violation of the non-pleaded
section since it and the section which actually covers the accused's conduct
both deal with the single offense of theft. The answer to that question
can not be found by reference to the act's legislative history or to its
language. Nor can the answer be prophesied, since courts in other states
where consolidation statutes have been enacted disagree as to the extent
of the procedural effects of such legislation.12 Thus, whether the courts
of Indiana will hold that evidence showing the commission of theft under
a provision other than that specifically pleaded will be sufficient to uphold
119. Should the suggested construction be adopted, when a defendant is charged
with theft by deception it will not matter whether the person defrauded intended to part
with possession alone or with both title and possession. Similarly, if a defendant is
charged with theft by receiving stolen property, whether the property received was
embezzled or taken by larceny will no longer be of procedural consequence.
120. Compare State v. Smith, 2 Wash.2d 118, 98 P.2d 647 (1939), State v. Mc-
Cullough, 157 Minn. 69, 195 N.W. 764 (1923), People v. Noblett, 244 N.Y. 355, 155
N.E. 670 (1920), and State v. Dickinson, 21 Mont. 595, 55 Pac. 539 (1898), holding
that pleading and variance requirements have not been affected by such legislation,
with People v. Nor Woods, 37 Cal.2d 584, 233 P.2d 891 (1951), and State v. Pete,
206 La. 1078, 20 So.2d 368 (1944), holding that a general charge will sufficie to uphold
a conviction if the defendant is found guilty of any one of the included crimes.
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a conviction remains to be seen. The Model Penal Code provides, "An
accusation of theft may be supported by evidence that it was committed
in any manner that would be theft under this Article, despite particulari-
zation in the indictment . . . subject only to the power of the court to
insure a fair trial by granting a continuance or other appropriate relief
where the defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice of the
charge or by surprise.' ' 21 It is suggested in view of the uncertainty
which now exists in Indiana in regard to this problem, that the wisest
course would have been to have included a similar provision in the In-
diana act.
B. Attempts
Another purpose of the Offenses Against Property Act is to define
and provide punishment for anti-social conduct that prior law should
have but did not prohibit. Several areas have been noted above where
this effort should prove beneficial, but one serious inadequacy of prior
law remains unremedied: The new act leaves unpunished the majority
of attempts to commit property crimes.
The Indiana criminal code does not include a general statutory
crime of attempting to commit a felony or misdemeanor. One statutory
provision does state that upon an indictment or affidavit for an offense
consisting of differing degrees, the jury may find the defendant not
guilty of the degree charged in the indictment while finding the defendant
guilty of a lesser degree or of an attempt to commit the offense charged. 22
However, this section has not been construed as a blanket provision
authorizing conviction for an attempt to commit any crime; 2 it only
means that if the statutory definition of a crime contains a specific
reference to an attempt to commit the crime, a conviction for an attempt
is proceduraly proper. The only statutory provisions in force outside of
the Offenses Against Property Act which specifically punish attempts to
commit property crimes are section 10-4709 which covers attempts to
commit robbery or larceny while armed with a deadly weapon and
section 10-4710 which prohibits an attempt to commit a felony in connec-
tion with automobile banditry.12  The only provision of the new act
expressly dealing with attempts is section 10-3041 which punishes an
attempt to obtain control over property by threat.'25 Section 10-3037,
121. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.60 (Tent. Draft No. 2 1954).
122. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1816 (Bums 1962).
123. See, e.g., State v. Sutherlin, 228 Ind. 587, 92 N.E.2d 923 (1950).
124. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4709 (Bums 1956); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4710
(Burns 1956).
125. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3041 (Bums Spec. Supp. 1963).
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although not expressly referring to attempts, does in substance penalize
certain types of attempts to obtain property by deception. 2 ' As a result,
the only punishable attempts to commit property crimes at the present
time are attempts to obtain property by threat or by the use of certain
deceptive practices, and attempts in connection with automobile banditry.
Prompt legislative action in this area should be forthcoming.
C. Conclusion
The Offenses Against Property Act will eliminate many of the
questionable tactics previously employed by attorneys by its consolidation
of previously distinct crimes into the single offense of theft. Many
substantive advancements based upon sound social policy and social need
have been incorporated into the new law. Although all possible problems
have not and never could be resolved in a single effort such as the act
represents, it is a significant and desirable advancement of our law in
relation to property offenses.
126. InD. ANN. STAT. § 10-3037 (Bums Spec. Supp. 1963). For example, the
section punishes as a related offense false advertising which is in substance an attempt
to obtain property by deception. Similarly, this section punishes as a related offense
the making of a knowingly false written statement for the purpose of obtaining credit
or other property, which also is actually an attempt to obtain property by deception.
